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Diamantoudi and E. S. Sartzetakis, Stable international environmental agreements: an analytical approach, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2006, 8(2): 247-2663. In this article, we study the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We offer an analytical treatment of the main model used in the literature and provide a formal solution (which was not available until now) while clarifying some misunderstandings that exist in the literature. We find that the single stable IEA consists of two, three or four signatories, when the number of countries is greater or equal to 5. In addition, we show that the well-being of signatories to a stable IEA is very close to its lowest level relative to the well-being of signatories of other non-stable EIAs. Whereas in our model countries, the variable of choice is that of emissions, we extend our results in case the selection variable is the reduction effort.

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